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1.0 Introduction 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
The topic of political rhetoric concerns the strategies used to construct 
persuasive arguments in formal public debates and in everyday political disputes. The 
study of political rhetoric therefore touches upon the fundamental activities of 
democratic politics. As Kane and Patapan (2010, p. 372) observed, “because public 
discussion and debate are essential in a democracy, and because leaders are obliged to 
rule the sovereign people by means of constant persuasion, rhetoric is absolutely 
central”. Going further, Dryzek (2010) noted that rhetoric is also central to grass-roots 
political action: “Rhetoric facilitates the making and hearing of representation claims 
spanning subjects and audiences … democracy requires a deliberative system with 
multiple components whose linkage often needs rhetoric” (p. 319-339)1.  
Since the previous edition of the Handbook in 2003, academic writing on 
political rhetoric has greatly increased in volume and diversified in perspective. This 
work now spans a range of disciplines, including linguistics, political theory, 
international relations, communication studies and psychology. At the time of writing, 
there existed no integrative accounts of this body of literature. The task of 
summarizing the field is complicated by the fact that dialogue between academics 
working in different disciplinary contexts is often limited. In addition, the topic of 
political rhetoric is not always clearly demarcated from cognate constructs including 
political narrative (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012), framing (Chong, this volume), 
communication (Valentino & Nardis, this volume), conversation (cf. Remer, 1999), 
discourse (e.g. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), or deliberation (see Myers & 
Mendelberg, this volume). 
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Despite the diversity of approaches adopted, and the overlap with other topics 
addressed in political psychology, it is nevertheless possible to identify some 
distinctive aspects to theory and research on political rhetoric. First, contemporary 
scholars of political rhetoric tend to draw inspiration directly from classical writings 
on the subject. In the case of rhetorical psychology, this has involved the use of 
classical scholarship as a source of insights about human mentality as well as about 
the structure and function of persuasive argument. Second, authors who write on the 
subject of political rhetoric often adopt a critical perspective in relation to their 
academic discipline of origin.  In political science, the study of rhetoric may be 
presented as an alternative to established perspectives on political beliefs and 
decision-making. In social and political psychology, interest in rhetoric arose as part 
of the “turn to language”, a movement that involved a rejection of cognitivism, and a 
commitment to approaching talk and text as strategic communicative action rather 
than as expressions of inner psychological processes, states or traits (e.g. Burman & 
Parker, 1993; Edwards, 1997; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Potter, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Shotter, 1993).  
Although the subject of rhetoric clearly pertains to spoken and written 
language, empirical research has generally proceeded independently of 
methodological advances in the analysis of communication. However, some linguists 
have recently begun to advocate closer dialogue between students of rhetoric and 
researchers concerned with the fine details of discourse and stylistics (Foxlee, 2012), 
and scholars in communication studies have begun to consider the application of field 
methods to the in situ study of the rhetoric of protest movements (Middleton, Senda-
Cook, & Endres, 2011). Similarly, unlike many other perspectives that originated 
from the “turn to language”, rhetorical psychologists have not traditionally promoted 
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any specific methodological technique. On the contrary: Billig (1988a) originally 
advocated traditional scholarship as an alternative to methodology for the 
interpretation of ideological themes in political rhetoric.  More recently, psychological 
researchers have studied examples of political rhetoric using a variety of research 
techniques, including discourse analytic approaches to assist the identification of 
interpretative repertoires, and conversation analysis for the fine-grained analysis of 
the details of political speeches and arguments. Researchers with an explicitly 
political agenda may also adopt critical discourse analytic methods.  
 
2.0 Changes and continuities in scholarship on political rhetoric. 
..................................................................................................................................... 
2.1 What is “Rhetoric”? 
In his monograph, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric, Booth (2004, p. xiii) noted a 
“threatening morass of rival definitions”. On the one hand, the term rhetoric can 
pertain to vacuous, insincere speech or political “spin” (Partington, 2003), as reflected 
in English expressions such as “mere rhetoric”, “empty rhetoric”, or “rhetorical 
question”.  Bishop Whatley introduced his textbook Elements of Rhetoric with the 
comment that the title was “apt to suggest to many minds an associated idea of empty 
declamation, or of dishonest artifice” (1828, p. xxxi). Were Bishop Whatley writing 
today, this cautionary note to his readership might still be warranted. Contemporary 
writers are still inclined to cast political rhetoric as the antithesis of action (e.g. 
Browne & Dickson, 2010; McCrisken, 2011), or reality (e.g. Easterly & Williamson, 
2011; Hehir, 2011).  On the other hand, the term rhetoric may also be used in a more 
positive sense: to refer to the practical art of effective communication. In Institutio 
Oratoria, the Roman rhetorician Quintilian defined rhetoric as the science of 
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“speaking well”. An alternative, related, use of the term pertains to the study of the art 
of effective communication. This is illustrated by Aristotle’s (1909, p. 5) well-known 
assertion that the function of rhetoric is “not to persuade, but to discover the available 
means of persuasion in each case”.  It is this, more neutral, conception of rhetoric that 
currently predominates.  
Classical accounts of rhetoric focused on formal, public speech (the term 
rhetoric derives from the Greek, ρήτωρ, meaning orator). However, contemporary 
authors have extended the scope of rhetorical scholarship to include informal talk (e.g. 
Billig, 1991); texts (e.g. Spurr, 1993); photography and visual images (Hill & 
Helmers, 2004); maps (Wallach, 2011); cartoons (Morris, 1993); film (Morreale, 
1991); digital communication (Zappen, 2005); architecture (Robin, 1992), graphic art 
(Scott, 2010), and even food (Frye & Bruner, 2012).  
Classical work on rhetoric was not confined to the political sphere. Aristotle 
described political (deliberative) oratory as argument that is concerned with weighing 
up alternative future courses of action relating to finances, war and peace, national 
defense, trade, and legislation. He distinguished this kind of talk from judicial (or 
forensic) oratory, practised in the law courts, which focuses on questions of 
accusation, justice and truth concerning past events, and from epideictic (ceremonial) 
oratory, concerned the attribution of praise or censure in the present2.  Contemporary 
scholars have further extended the sphere of application of rhetorical studies, often 
believing like Booth (2004 p. xi) that “[r]hetoric is employed at every moment when 
one human being intends to produce, through the use of signs or symbols, some effect 
on another”.  However, as Gill and Whedbee (1997) noted, it is still commonly 
supposed that, “the essential activities of rhetoric are located on a political stage” (p. 
157).  
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2.2 Changing Contexts of Political Rhetoric 
Current studies of rhetoric continue to draw inspiration from classical works, 
such as Cicero’s De Oratore, Qunitilian’s Institutio Oratoria and Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
At the same time, it is recognized that the contexts in which, and media through 
which, political rhetoric now operates are in many respects very different from the 
situation facing the classical Greek or Roman orator (see also Valentino & Nardis, 
this volume).  
In the classical period, political oratory required a loud voice and formal 
gestures, as orators spoke in person to mass audiences. In the modern world, political 
oratory is typically mediated to distal audiences by textual or electronic means of 
communication often blurring the distinction between politics and entertainment (van 
Zoonen, 2005). This has impacted upon political rhetoric in a number of ways. For 
example, political leaders now often adopt an informal, conversational style as 
evidenced in particular in the genre of the televised political interview. The distinction 
between public and private aspects of political discourse is collapsing (Thompson, 
2011), resulting in a rise of self-expressive politics and the personalization of formal 
political rhetoric. In addition, whereas classical work on political rhetoric focused on 
oratory, more recent work has come to focus on what Barthes (1977) called the 
“rhetoric of the image” that was not envisaged by the purely verbal logic of traditional 
rhetoric (Roque, 2008)3.  
The fact that political rhetoric is now often conveyed through television, 
newsprint or e-communication has resulted in a diversification of potential audiences. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) distinguished between the particular audience 
(the people being specifically addressed in a particular communication) and the 
universal audience, comprised of all those who might in principle hear or dis/agree 
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with the message. In either case, the audiences may be composite in character, 
composed of subgroups with multiple, often competing, views and interests. Van 
Eemeren (2010) distinguished between two types of composite audience: mixed 
audiences comprised of individuals and subgroups with different starting points in 
relation to a communicator’s topic or message, and multiple audiences comprising 
individuals and groups with different (possibly incompatible) commitments in relation 
to the issue under discussion. The increased use of mediated communication increased 
the potential diversity of the audiences that a political communicator is expected to 
address in a single speech or text. In addition, the situation may be further 
complicated by the fact that the audiences being addressed in a particular 
communication need not always correspond with the constituencies that a speaker is 
claiming to represent, or towards whom she or he may be held politically 
accountable4.  
The increasing importance of the mass and electronic media has also resulted 
in the effective rhetorical context of formal political communications becoming 
extended both temporally and spatially. The British MP Harold Wilson once famously 
remarked that, “a week is a long time in politics”. However, the fact that records of 
political debates, speeches and other forms of communication are increasingly easy to 
retrieve through electronic search-engines means that political rhetoric can now have 
an infinite half-life, with the consequence that that words uttered or written at one 
point in time may be retrieved and used in a different context (e.g. Antaki & Leudar, 
1991).  
Since the previous edition of the Handbook in 2003, academic authors have 
been paying increasing attention to the impact of new media technologies on political 
rhetoric. Bennett and Iyengar (2008) suggested that the potential impact of new 
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technologies might eventually render previous academic perspectives on media 
effects obsolete. In particular, they drew attention to the ways in which new 
technologies afford increasing selective exposure to political information, the 
fragmentation of audiences, and the decline of inadvertent citizen exposure to political 
information through the media. Some authors have emphasised the democratizing 
potential of new technologies, which afford cosmopolitan communication between 
citizens (Mihelj et al., 2011) and which are capable to bridging different social 
networks (Hampton, 2011). New technologies may facilitate direct communication 
between citizens and decision makers, citizens’ active production of political 
messages, and collective political protest. Facebook and Twitter certainly facilitated 
the informal political communication of protesters in the Arab revolution, indignados 
in Madrid, and the Occupy movement.  
However, some authors have been more sceptical about the actual effects of 
the digital revolution on political rhetoric and engagement. For example, Jouët, Vedel 
and Comby (2011) observed that French citizens still obtain political information 
primarily from the mass media, and Jansen and Koop (2005) reported that internet 
discussion boards during British Columbia’s election were dominated by a relatively 
small number of users. Deacon and Wring (2011) suggested that that the promise of 
the Internet as a campaign tool in the British general election of 2010 turned out to 
have been overrated. Similarly, in their analyses of videos and comments posted to 
YouTube in response to the Dutch anti-Islam video Fitna, van Zoonen and colleagues 
argued that YouTube enabled the airing of a wide variety of views, but at the same 
time actually stifled dialogue between those supporting or opposing the stance of the 
video (van Zoonen et al, 2010, 2011).  
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2.3 Recent Trends in Research on Political Rhetoric 
Early contributions to rhetorical psychology often drew attention to the 
rhetorical aspects of everyday political attitudes. Subsequent research in this vein has 
considered the argumentative strategies employed by members of the general public 
to justify political participation and non-participation (Condor & Gibson, 2007), and 
to present views concerning immigration, racism, multiculturalism and citizenship in 
such a manner that conforms to norms of public reason (Figgou & Condor, 2007; 
Gibson & Hamilton, 2011). 
More commonly, research on political rhetoric focuses on real-world contexts 
of political engagement. This has included work on the rhetorical strategies adopted 
by social movements (Chavez, 2011; Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011); protest groups 
(Griggs & Howarth, 2004; Sowards & Renegar, 2006) and E-activist groups (Eaton, 
2010; Sommerfeldt, 2011).  However, most empirical studies of political rhetoric 
continue to focus on formal political communication including parliamentary debates 
(e.g. Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Vanderbeck, 2011); political campaigns and 
marketing (e.g. Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Jerit, 2004; Payne, 2010), and high-profile 
speeches, texts or films and historical documents (e.g. Terrill, 2009; 2011; Tileagă, 
2009a;b; 2012a;b). Popular awareness of Barak Obama’s rhetorical skill has led to a 
recent revival of academic interest in the oratory styles of particular political leaders 
(e.g. Coe & Reitzes, 2010; Isaksen, 2011; Grube, 2010; Toye, 2011; Utley & Heyse, 
2009). 
 The substantive topics investigated in studies of political rhetoric tend to 
reflect political concerns of the day. Current research continues to focus on issues 
related to political rhetoric in debates concerning national identity (Condor, 2011; 
Finell & Liebkind, 2010); immigration and citizenship (e.g. Boromisza-Habashi, 
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2011; Every & Augoustinos, 2007); foreign policy (Kratochvil, Cibulková & Beneš, 
2006), and the legitimation of war (Bostdorff, 2011; McGarr, 2011; Oddo, 2011). 
Recently, researchers have turned their attention rhetoric concerning climate change 
(Harrison & King, 2011; Kurtz, Augoustinos & Crabb, 2010), terrorism (De Castella 
& McGarty, 2011), and the “war on terror” (Esch, 2010; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011; 
Kaufer & Al-Malki, 2009).   
Empirical analyses of political rhetoric often focus on specific argumentative 
devices, tropes or commonplaces. In this respect, researchers are inclined to 
foreground the micro-features of communication that are often overlooked in research 
that treats political discourse as a reflection of cognitive activity rather than as a form 
of communicative action. For example, analyses of conceptual or integrative 
complexity in political talk and text typically treat clichés (“cryptic or glib remarks”), 
idioms, satire and sarcasm, as unscoreable (Baker-Brown et al. 1992). In contrast, in 
rhetorical analyses, figures of speech are typically treated as important argumentative 
devices. Contemporary research has focused on questions related to the strategic use 
of metaphors (Ferrari, 2007), proverbs (Orwenjo, 2009), slogans (Kephart & Rafferty, 
2009), satire (Woodward, 2011), humour (Dmitriev, 2008; Timmerman, Gussman & 
King, 2012), politeness (Fracchiolla, 2011; Shibamoto-Smith, 2011), and appeals to 
common-sense values such as “change” (Roan & White, 2010), “choice” (Gaard, 
2010) and “community” (Buckler, 2007) in political talk and texts. Over the past few 
years, scholars have demonstrated an increased concern over the use of religious 
language and idioms in formal political rhetoric (e.g. Kaylor, 2011; Marietta, 2012; 
Stecker, 2011; Terrill, 2007).  
In view of the range of work that now exists on the subject, it is not possible to 
provide a comprehensive account of academic perspectives on political rhetoric in a 
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single chapter. In the following pages we will focus specifically on the ways in which 
recent studies of political rhetoric relate to two key topics of interest to political 
psychologists: argument, and identity. 
 
3.0 Political Rhetoric and Argumentation. 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
The term “argument” may be applied to a range of phenomena, including 
disputes between individuals or groups, and to coherent sets of statements justifying a 
single premise (“line of argument”). In its most inclusive sense, all verbal behaviour 
might potentially qualify for the label of “argument”. For example, Potter (1997) 
suggested that descriptive discourse necessarily has offensive (critical) aspects in so 
far as it explicitly or implicitly seeks to undermine rival versions of events, and 
defensive (justificatory) aspects in so far as speakers attempt to shore up their 
accounts from attack by rivals5.  
Authors who focus on the argumentative aspects of political rhetoric often 
position themselves in direct opposition to other existing academic accounts of 
political opinions, belief and action. In Arguing and Thinking, Billig (1987) presented 
rhetorical psychology as an alternative to standard social scientific approaches to 
reasoning, attitudes, and ideology. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004; 2006; 2009) 
set their rhetorical approach to social and self-categorization processes as an 
alternative to reified social psychological perspectives on context, identity and 
leadership.   Finlayson (2006; 2007; Finlayson & Martin, 2008) offered rhetorical 
political analysis (RPA) as an alternative to established political science perspectives 
on ideas and beliefs.  In all of these cases, the authors suggested that a focus on 
rhetorical argument might counter a tendency on the part of social scientists to 
prioritise consensus over contestation. In fact, theorists who foreground the 
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argumentative character of political rhetoric often treat the very idea of political 
“consensus” itself as a strategic rhetorical construction (e.g. Beasley, 2001; Edelman, 
1977; Weltman & Billig, 2001), and analyse the ways in which speakers may work up 
images of unanimity in an effort to represent a particular state of affairs as 
indisputable (e.g. Potter & Edwards, 1990).  
 In this section of the chapter we will focus on three areas of work of particular 
relevance to political psychology: the rhetorical psychology perspective on the 
argumentative nature of thinking and attitudes; the ideological dilemmas perspective 
on the argumentative aspects of ideology, and the Rhetorical Political Analysis 
perspective on the argumentative aspects of policy decision making. 
 
3.1 Rhetorical Psychology. 
 
3.1.1 Arguing and Thinking 
Rhetorical psychologists adopt the view that the same principles underlie both 
public oratory and private deliberation. The idea that human thought evidences 
similarities with public arguments draws on a long tradition of scholarship. For 
example, Francis Bacon suggested that “the solitary thinker uses rhetoric to excite his 
own appetite and will in a sort of intrapersonal negotiation – that is … to ‘talk oneself 
into something”’ (Conley, 1990, p. 164). Billig similarly suggested that the principle 
difference between deliberative oratory and the internal deliberations of thinking “is 
that in the latter one person has to provide both sets of arguments, as the self splits 
into two sides, which debate, and negate, each other” (Billig 1991, p. 48)6. More 
recently, Billig (2008) has pointed out that in the eighteenth century, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury also viewed thinking as being argumentative and argued that many of the 
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ideas of current approaches to critical psychology can be traced back to Shaftesbury’s 
largely forgotten work. 
Billig contrasted this perspective on thinking as argument with cognitive 
psychology models which characterise human reasoning, problem-solving and 
decision-making as a matter of information processing or rule following. Drawing 
from the sophist Protagoras’ famous maxim, “In every question, there are two sides to 
the argument, exactly opposite to each other”, Billig contended that just as public 
argument is two-sided, so too is the solitary psychological process of thinking. 
Because both sides to an argument can produce reasonable justifications, and both can 
counter the criticisms of each other, the process of thinking is not necessarily 
motivated by a drive towards consistency. On the contrary, in the course of 
deliberation people often find themselves moved by the spirit of contradiction. 
Rhetorical psychology hence substitutes the conventional psychological image of the 
human thinker as a rule-following bureaucrat with the image of the human thinker as 
a deliberator “shuttling between contrary opinions” (Billig, 1996, p.186). 
  Psychologists have long considered the process of categorization to be 
“the foundation of thought” (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956), and it has often been 
held that categorization involves an economy of mental or discursive effort. For 
example, Morley (1886) described labels as “devices for saving talkative persons the 
trouble of thinking” (p. 142).  More recently, Rosch (1978) famously described the 
function of category systems as "to provide maximum information with the least 
cognitive effort" (p. 28). In contrast, Billig suggested that these accounts of 
categorization presented a distinctly one-sided image of the capacities of human 
beings as reasoning subjects. To accept the argumentative, two-sided, nature of 
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thinking is to appreciate the capacity of people both to employ categories, but also to 
engage in the opposite cognitive and rhetorical operation of particularization.  
  In so far as categories are understood as rhetorical phenomena, the process 
of categorization need not be understood to save people the trouble of thinking. On 
the contrary, when used in the course of communication, categories typically 
constitute objects of deliberation and the topics of argument.  Any act of 
generalization can always be potentially negated by a particularization, treating a 
particular object or event as a “special case”. In the course of conversation, 
generalizations are typically qualified, as a speaker employs a category while also 
acknowledging the existence of exceptions. Moreover, people can debate the merits of 
classifying people or events in one way rather than another, the defining attributes of 
a category, the inferences that may be drawn from knowledge of category 
membership, and the appropriate use of labels.  
These considerations have particular relevance to political psychology in so 
far as many of the basic categories of contemporary political discourse are essentially 
contested (Gallie, 1956), that is, they are the subject of continual disputes which 
cannot be settled by “appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of 
logic alone” (Gray, 1978, p. 344), such as “power”, “democracy”, “representation”, 
and “liberty”. Conventionally, social and political psychologists have been inclined to 
treat political constructs as variables that can be relatively easily operationalized and 
measured. For example, researchers investigate the “effects of power” on political 
cognition or action, the situations under which intergroup behaviour is “determined by 
fairness motives”, the extent to which individuals or groups differ in their 
understanding of “equality”, and so forth. In contrast, researchers adopting a 
rhetorical perspective are more disposed to study the ways in which actors pursue 
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political projects through flexible and strategic appeals to particular understandings of 
power, fairness and equality. For example, Summers (2007) analysed debates in 
Western Australian parliamentary speeches supporting or opposing the Lesbian and 
Gay Law Reform Act, and observed how both sides of the debate used appeals to 
equality, human rights, democracy, and the interests of children, which the speakers 
treated as rhetorical bottom-lines. Similarly, research has noted how arguments 
designed to support, and to oppose, various forms of ethnic discrimination may both 
appeal to shared liberal values of equality, fairness and individualism (e.g. 
Augoustinos, Tuffin & Every, 2005). 
Nick Hopkins, Steve Reicher and Vered Kahani-Hopkins adopted a rhetorical 
approach to social categorization in a programme of research investigating the 
strategies used by politicians and political activists for the purposes of political 
mobilization (e.g. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins 2004; Hopkins & Reicher, 1997; 
Hopkins, Reicher & Kahani-Hopkins, 2003; Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; 
Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; 2001).  These authors based their work on self-
categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) but argued 
that a reliance on laboratory experimentation could lead social psychologists to 
overlook the extent to which social categories may represent the object of, rather than 
merely a prior condition for, political contestation. As Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins 
(2004) put it: 
Whilst experimental research has many strengths, there is a danger that an 
exclusive reliance on laboratory-based paradigms restricts the development of 
theory. Most obviously, as such paradigms are weak in exploring processes of 
argument there is a danger that theories of categorization underplay the 
importance of rhetoric and dispute. (p. 42). 
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As an example of work combining self categorization theoretic perspectives 
with a rhetorical approach to categorization we may consider Hopkins and Kahani-
Hopkins’s (2004) analysis of the rival social category constructions mobilized in texts 
by groups of Muslim activists in Britain. On the one hand, the Muslim Parliament of 
Great Britain represented Islam and the West as entirely incompatible categories, such 
that any accommodation to Western societies or values would necessarily 
compromise Muslim identity. This category scheme did not simply sharply 
differentiate Muslim from non-Muslim Britons, but it also facilitated identification 
between British Muslims and the global Muslim ummah. Advocates of this position 
adopted the view that categories of ethnicity and nationality were incompatible with 
Muslim identity and, further, that these constructs were themselves part of an 
ideological strategy promulgated by Western governments aiming to undermine 
Muslims’ political consciousness.  
In contrast, members of the UK Imams and Mosques Council argued that 
British Muslims were an integral part of British society. Rather than viewing the West 
as embodying the antithesis of Islamic values, these activists pointed to the existence 
of shared values.  Proponents of this position not only challenged the idea that 
participation in a Western community subverted Muslim identity, but also argued that 
identification with non-Muslims was in fact an integral aspect of Muslim identity. In 
this case, the Islamic ummah was construed as a heterogeneous group which 
instantiated the very values of tolerance and diversity necessary to function actively 
and effectively in a modern multicultural society. 
Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins’s analysis highlighted a series of issues that are 
often overlooked in experimental studies of self-categorization processes. First, they 
did not consider category homogeneity, distinctiveness or entitativity simply as the 
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cognitive antecedents to, or consequences of, social categorization. Rather, these 
phenomena were viewed as the subject and outcome of active debate.  Second, by 
treating social categorization as a rhetorical phenomenon, Hopkins and Kahani-
Hopkins were able appreciate how the meanings of Islam and The West were 
established in an extended line of argument in which the speaker also constructed a 
version of group interests, social context, and the legitimacy of particular future 
courses of action. Finally, by approaching these competing category schemes as 
aspects of strategic rhetoric, the authors were able to appreciate their dialogic 
qualities. The two representational schemata that Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins 
identified in British Muslim activists’ rhetoric were not simply two mirror-image 
versions of the categories of Muslim and the West. Rather, each version was produced 
in such a way as to address, and to attempt to undermine, the other. 
 
3.1.2 Attitudes as advocacy 
Although rhetorical psychologists draw attention to the flexible, and often 
contradictory, ways in which people can describe and evaluate political actors and 
events, they do not overlook the extent to which individuals and groups may display 
consistency in political opinions (cf. Caprara and Vecchione, this volume). For 
example, Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004) did not find members of the Muslim 
Parliament of Great Britain switching back and forth between arguing that Western 
policies of cultural accommodation threatened the integrity of Muslim identity, and 
arguing in support of the UK Government’s Community Cohesion programme. On 
the contrary, the various British Muslim political activists maintained a relatively 
clear and consistent line of argument. Billig suggested that when social actors adopt 
and defend a particular point of view, their behaviour might be likened to that of a 
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public advocate, “who has decided upon a single stance and is orating upon the 
virtues of the chosen position” (1996, p.186).  
Rhetorical psychology does not treat an individual’s assertion of attitudes and 
opinions as a straightforward report of their subjective appraisals7. Rather, the act of 
claiming an attitude or offering an opinion involves an intervention into a public 
controversy8. This means that not all beliefs qualify as attitudes (Billig, 1988b). 
Within a given social context there will be certain matters that are treated as non-
controversial, common sense.  It is only on potentially disputable matters that an 
individual can be said to hold opinions or express attitudes.  
In so far as attitudes constitute stances in a public debate, any line of argument 
(logos) only makes sense in relation to alternative arguments (anti-logoi). Sometimes 
a speaker may explicitly set out the anti-logoi to his or her own position. In other 
situations, a speaker may leave their anti-logos implicit. However, merely to declare 
oneself to be pro-capital punishment is, by implication, to take a stance against the 
abolition of the death penalty; to declare oneself pro-life is to oppose pro-choice 
arguments; to proclaim one’s support for gun control is implicitly to take issue with 
the arguments of the firearms lobby; to argue in favour of multicultural policies of 
social integration is to take a position against the view that Muslim identity is 
fundamentally incompatible with Western values. 
In ordinary social life, advocacy does not simply involve adopting a position 
for or against some state of affairs, as is normally required of research respondents 
when faced with an attitude scale or opinion survey. When expressed in the course of 
everyday conversation, attitude avowals are typically accompanied by reasons, 
whether these are direct justifications for the views proposed or criticisms of 
competing positions.  The internal consistency of these lines of argument may 
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represent an important consideration, but not because human beings have an inner 
drive or need for cognitive consistency. Rather, the internal coherence of attitude 
avowals, and the reliability with which an individual adopts a particular stance over a 
period of time, may be rhetorically motivated in so far as charges of inconsistency 
may weaken the force of an argument. It follows that individuals need not always 
attend to the logical consistency of their accounts. Indeed, discourse analysts have 
often pointed to variation in positions that a speaker may endorse in the flow of 
mundane talk. However, in so far as a speaker is publicly adopting a particular stance 
on a controversial issue, the need to maintain (or at least be seen to maintain) a 
consistent argument may become a relevant concern.  
An interactional requirement for consistency need not, however, lead to 
rhetorical inflexibility. When presenting their attitude on a particular issue, people do 
not merely have a set of relevant considerations that they present identically on each 
occasion the topic arises. Instead, they tailor their argument to the rhetorical context 
in which they are talking9. Even individuals with strong, crystallized, political views 
show a good deal of flexibility in their talk. For example, in a study of the way that 
families in England talked about the British Royal Family, Billig (1991; 1992) noted 
one case in which everyone agreed that the father had strong views against the 
monarchy. He constantly argued with his wife and children on the topic. However, in 
his arguments the father did not merely repeat the same statements, but flexibly 
managed his arguments to counter those of the other members of his family. 
Moreover, he alternated between radical and conservative rhetoric, as he counter 
posed his logoi to the anti-logoi of his family, presenting himself at one moment as a 
radical opposing the Establishment, and at other times as the defender of British 
values.  
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Billig (1989) distinguished two ways in which individuals may be understood 
to hold a view in relation to a public controversy. Inter-subjective perspectives 
presume the existence of a singular, ultimately discernable, empirical reality.  In this 
case, disagreement may be attributed to initial error on the part of at least one of the 
parties concerned. In contrast, multi-subjective perspectives treat dispute as the result 
of plural, and potentially irreconcilable, values or points of view. Like anything else, 
the inter-subjective or multi-subjective character of a dispute may, itself, constitute an 
object of contestation. Moreover, individuals need not always adopt a consistent 
position on whether a particular clash of political views should be regarded as a 
disagreement over matters of (singular) fact or of (multiple) competing values. For 
example, Condor (2011) reported how the same UK politicians could treat an attitude 
in favour of multiculturalism as a matter of multi-subjectivity when discussing the EU 
(displaying respect for the rights of other EU states to adopt assimilationist policies of 
social integration) whilst treating this as a matter of inter-subjectivity in a UK context, 
in which case all alternative perspectives were presented as irrational and misguided.  
 
3.2 Ideological Common Places and Ideological Dilemmas. 
Billig (1987) noted how classical rhetoricians advised speakers to advance 
their cases by using common places (topoi): references to facts or moral values that 
will be shared by audiences. Formal political rhetoric often involves the use of 
common places that appeal to the common sense of audiences. McGee (1980) coined 
the term ideograph to describe this phenomenon: 
An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a 
high order abstraction representing commitment to a particular but equivocal 
and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior 
and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and 
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guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as 
acceptable and laudable.” (p. 15). 
 
We noted in section 2 that a good deal of current empirical research involves 
identifying the use of virtue words (McGee, 1980 p. 6) such as “community”, 
“change” or “choice”, and mapping their rhetorical functions in specific arguments.  
McGee suggested that ideographs may provide a basis for shared understanding 
between speakers and grounds for coordinated action, “when a claim is warranted by 
such terms as ‘law,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘tyranny,’ or ‘trial by jury,’ ... it is presumed that human 
beings will react predictably” (McGee, 1980, p. 6).  However, the fact that the key 
terms of political debate are essentially contestable means that although speakers 
often treat appeals to values such as fairness, the national interest, or human rights as 
if they were non-contentious there is no guarantee that their audience will necessarily 
accept their argument. In practice, it is always possible for these appeals to be opened 
up for critical consideration or for exceptions to be made for particular cases.  
Many social scientific accounts of ideology treat social actors as the passive 
recipients of inherited belief systems. From this kind of perspective, ideology is views 
as a conservative force, preventing challenges to the political status quo (Jost, 
Federico & Napier, 2009) and imposing an overarching consistency to thoughts, 
beliefs and values (cf. Nelson, 1977). Billig suggested that an understanding of 
ideology as systems of social and psychological “constraint” could be corrected by 
attending to the presence of contrary themes within ideological systems. Social 
scientists often draw attention to the contradictory nature of social maxims (many 
hands make light work but too many cooks spoil the broth). Conventionally, such 
contradictions have been viewed as evidence of the irrationality of common sense (cf. 
Billig, 1994; Shapin, 2001). In contrast, Billig argued that the contrary aspects of 
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cultural common sense in fact represent the preconditions for two-sided argument, 
and consequently for rhetorical deliberation within and between members of a 
particular society. From this perspective, the ordinary person, “is not a blind dupe, 
whose mind has been filled by outside forces and who reacts unthinkingly. The 
subject of ideology is a rhetorical being who thinks and argues with ideology” (Billig, 
1991a, p. 2).  
Billig’s (1987) ideas concerning the productive potential of opposing topoi 
were developed in the text, Ideological Dilemmas (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, 
Middleton & Radley, 1988), which presented a series of case studies illustrating how 
contradictions within liberal ideology (between competing values of equality versus 
respect for authority, of fairness as equity or equality, of individualism versus the 
common good) played out in everyday debates concerning gender, education, 
prejudice, health and expertise. The ambivalent quality of these arguments was not 
seen to reflect a lack of engagement or sophistication on the part of the speakers. On 
the contrary, it was precisely the availability of opposing themes that enabled ordinary 
people to find the familiar puzzling and therefore worthy of deliberation.  
Although Billig and his colleagues assumed a liberal democratic political 
culture as part of the background against which everyday talk took place, they did not 
explicitly consider how dilemmatic themes operate in deliberation over political 
issues. However, subsequent research has applied the ideological dilemmas approach 
to everyday political reasoning on issues such as unemployment (Gibson, 2011), 
gender inequality (Benschop et al., 2001; Stokoe, 2000) and nationality and 
citizenship (e.g. Bozatzis, 2009; Condor, 2000; 2006; Condor & Gibson, 2007; 
Sapountzis, 2008).  
Billig and his colleagues noted that communicators do not always attend to 
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dilemmatic aspects of discourse overtly. On occasions, “[d]iscourse which seems to 
be arguing for one point may contain implicit meanings which could be made explicit 
to argue for the counter-point” (p. 23). An example of implicit ideological dilemmas 
is provided by Condor’s (2011) analysis of political speeches in favour of “British 
multiculturalism”. Condor observed that the speakers often referred explicitly to their 
anti-logoi: arguments in favour of ethnic or cultural nationalism, exemplified by 
Victorian Imperialist discourses. However, analysis of the texts of these speeches 
showed that the arguments put forward by advocates of British Multiculturalism 
rested upon the claim that the contemporary UK represented a “special case”.  
Consequently, far from opposing the general ideology of ethnic nationalism, the 
speakers were in fact presupposing a normal social order of national ethnic 
homogeneity. Moreover, the specific topoi that the speakers invoked in the course of 
justifying British Multiculturalism in fact closely echoed the ideograms employed by 
previous generations of politicians in epideictic rhetoric celebrating the aesthetic, 
moral, economic and political value of British Imperialism. 
 
3.3 Rhetorical Political Analysis 
Although the rhetorical turn in the social sciences often involved a specific 
focus on political oratory and argument, until recently, this work has been relatively 
neglected by political theorists (Garsten, 2011) and political scientists (Finlayson, 
2004; 2006; 2007). Arguing that approaches based on rational choice theory embraced 
“too narrow a concept of reasoning” (2007 p. 545), Finlayson’s alternative, which he 
termed rhetorical political analysis (RPA), recast political decision-making as a 
collective, argumentative activity.  
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Finlayson noted that democratic politics is premised on the assumption of the 
“irreducible and contested plurality of public life” (p. 552), and that political ideas 
and beliefs “are always turned into arguments, into elements of contestable 
propositions…which, if they are to survive, must win adherents in a contest of 
persuasive presentation” (2007, p. 559). Politics is hence not characterised by beliefs 
or decisions per se, but by “the presence of beliefs in contradiction with each other” 
(p. 552). Finlayson argued that political rhetoric deals both with areas of empirical 
uncertainty (in Billig’s terms, inter-subjective disagreement) and also disputes which 
result from the fact that citizens approach the same issue from different perspectives 
(Billig’s multi-subjective disagreement).  
Like Billig, Finlayson suggested that political categories typically constitute 
the object of contestation.  Taking the example of poverty (cf. Edelman, 1977), he 
observed that political deliberation does not only concern “the best policy instrument 
for alleviating poverty but how poverty should be defined (and thus what would 
actually constitute its alleviation), whether or not poverty is a problem, and if it is, 
then the kind of problem it might be (a moral, economic, social or security problem)” 
(p. 2007, p. 550).   
Finlayson argued that political reasoning is necessarily dialogic, in so far as 
any political theorist needs to justify their beliefs to others who may well adopt very 
different points of view.  Moreover, he suggested that political ideas and beliefs are 
not simply expressed in the course of debate, but rather that political concepts, values 
and intentions are in fact formulated through an on-going process of argument. 
Similarly, although policy-making involves the formation of political consensus, this 
process need not involve the discovery of common interests or views, but rather the 
construction of agreement through the process of argument.  
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At present, little research has been conducted within the RPA perspective 
(although see Finlayson & Martin’s [2008] analysis of Tony Blair’s last speech to the 
UK Labour Party Conference in 2006). However, Finlayson (2006; 2007; 2008) 
provided a general outline of the ways in which future empirical work might 
develop10. First, RPA would approach any particular political debate in relation to its 
original rhetorical context, and also with a view to the ways in which the mediated 
character of contemporary politics can serve to render rhetorical situations fluid and 
ambiguous. Second, analysis should consider how the topic (the point of the 
controversy or bone of contention) is itself argumentatively established. Specifically, 
this would involve (1) Factual conjecture: if/that a state of affairs exists (e.g. has Iraq 
attempted to purchase yellowcake uranium from Niger?); (2) Definition: naming the 
issue, (e.g. “the Iraq war”, “war in Iraq”, “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, “preventive 
war”, “occupation of Iraq”, “illegal invasion”); (3) Assessment of the nature of the act 
or policy (e.g. is Western military intervention in Iraq a defence of national interests, 
a response to human rights violations, “the central front in the War on Terror” or a 
“fatal mistake”?); (4) The boundaries of legitimate argument: the rules concerning 
who, when and where an issue may be discussed. 
Third, RPA would analyse the substantive content of any particular political 
argument. This would include attention to, (1) The ways in which the policy under 
dispute is framed in relation to the axes of the universal and the particular; (2) The 
formulation of specific states of affairs through metaphor, and narrative sequencing, 
and the use of rhetorical common places; (3) Modes of persuasive appeal: whether the 
speaker is appealing to ethos, pathos or logos; (4) Genre: how speakers cast their talk 
as deliberative, forensic or epideictic; (5) How particular policy recommendations are 
rhetorically linked to general ideological or party political commitments.  
 26 
In many respects, Finlayson’s RPA is similar to Billig’s approach to rhetorical 
psychology. However, there are three important differences between the perspectives. 
First, RPA focuses on formal political decision-making, emphasising public clashes of 
views between individuals or groups, each adopting one-sided (largely 
institutionalised) standpoints. In contrast, rhetorical psychology often focuses on 
private deliberation on the part of individuals. This is reflected in the different ways in 
which the two perspectives consider the “ideological” aspects of political argument 
(rhetorical psychology emphasising conflicts within widescale ideological systems, 
RPA stressing the consolidation of distinct political belief systems).  
Second, because RPA focuses on political decision-making, the resolution of 
dispute, and the ways in which political actors may construct robust arguments that 
can subsequently form the basis for collaborative action. In contrast, rhetorical 
psychology tends to stress the open-ended quality of argumentation. Billig has drawn 
on Shaftesbury’s idealised view of a society in which there is a wonderful mix of 
“contrarieties”, filled with debate, difference and mockery: “In this image of utopia, 
the lion does not lie down in silence with the lamb, but the Epicurean and stoic meet 
again and again to argue, to seek truth and to laugh” (Billig, 2008, p. 134). 
Third, RPA does not consider issues relating to the construction of self or 
social identity, matters which Finlayson devolved to discursive psychology (e.g. 2006, 
p. 539). As we shall see in the next section, rhetorical psychology, in common with 
many other perspectives on political language and communication, regards identity 
concerns as centrally and necessarily implicated in all political rhetoric. 
 
4.0 Political Rhetoric and Identity. 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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As we noted in section 2, Aristotle argued that audiences could be swayed not 
only by the style and content of an argument, but also the character projected by the 
speaker (ethos).  Classical theorists identified three categories of ethos: phronesis 
(involving wisdom and practical skills), arete (morality and virtue) and eunoia 
(goodwill towards the audience).  
In contemporary studies of political rhetoric, questions relating to ethos are 
often framed as a matter of the “identity” of the communicator.  The term identity is 
ambiguous, and academic discussions of political rhetoric have approached the issue 
of communicator identity in various ways. Some theorists have simply refused the 
identity construct, in so far as it might be understood to imply a singular or fixed 
sense of self (see Charland, 1987). More commonly, researchers have focused 
communicator identity as a rhetorical production. In A Rhetoric of Motives Burke 
(1969) suggested that identification lies at the heart of all persuasive rhetoric for “you 
persuade a man [sic] only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, 
tonality, order image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (p. 55). Burke 
called this projected commonality between speaker and audience consubstantiality. In 
this section, we will limit ourselves to discussing some of the strategies that 
contemporary political communicators may use to achieve consubstantiality when 
faced with composite audiences of the type outlined in Section 2. First, we consider 
how speakers may present their own rhetorical projects as exercises in political 
consensus. Second, we consider cases in which politicians appeal explicitly to broadly 
defined ingroups. Third, we examine the ways in which political commentators 
address aspirational categories, representing consubstantiality as a future project 
rather than a current condition. Finally, we discuss how speakers may implicitly 
display allegiance with mixed and multiple audiences, focusing in particular on the 
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use of first person pronouns. 
 
4.1 Taking and Avoiding Sides. 
 
One way in which a political communicator may deal with the problem of 
audience diversity is simply to side with one group against another. An example of 
the way in which a speaker may orient towards the establishment of consubstantiality 
with a distal community of representation rather than their immediate audience is 
provided by Rapley’s (1998) analysis of the maiden speech of Pauline Hanson, the 
independent Australian MP elected on an anti-immigration stance. Hanson did not 
claim commonality with the fellow members of parliament that she was ostensibly 
addressing. Instead, she stressed her commonality with the broader public. Hanson 
claimed to speak “just as an ordinary Australian” and not as “a polished politician”, 
asserting that “my view on issues is based on commonsense, and my experience as a 
mother of four children, as a sole parent, and as a business-woman running a fish and 
chip shop” (Rapley, 1998, p. 331).  
Rhetorical strategies are often polyvalent, serving a number of communicative 
functions simultaneously. In this case, through the act of siding with the “ordinary 
people” in opposition to the “the elite”, Hanson was also rhetorically enacting her 
commitment to populist political ideology.  However, in democratic political contexts, 
communicators who identify with more mainstream political parties are often 
confronted with a rhetorical dilemma. As Ilie (2003) observed, formal political debate 
often involves competing normative injunctions:  
Parliamentary debates presuppose, on the one hand, a spirit of adversariality, 
which is manifested in position claiming and opponent-challenging acts, and, 
on the other hand, a spirit of cooperativeness, which is manifest in joint 
decision-making and cross-party problem-solving processes in order to reach 
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commonly acceptable goals regarding future policies and suitable lines of 
action at a national level. (p. 73) 
 
More generally, although democratic political discourse operates within what Atkins 
(2010) termed the context of hegemonic competition, at the same time, politicians who 
adopt an overtly adversarial stance may be criticised for their adherence to a particular 
ideology (Kurtz et al, 2010), charged with prioritising partisan party interests over 
common national interests (Dickerson, 1998), or accused of negative political 
campaigning (cf. Fridkin & Kenney, 2011). Moreover, when an individual or group is 
attempting to mobilise support in a majority rule political system, it is often in their 
interests to appeal to as many sectors of their universal audience as possible.  
One strategy that a politician may employ to avoid being seen to side with a 
particular section of their audience or community of representation involves 
presenting their argument in such a way as to appear to incorporate a range of 
divergent points of view.  Fløttum (2010) reported a strategy that she termed the 
polemical not, in which a speaker suggests that his or her rhetorical project goes 
beyond current divisive arguments. As an example, Fløttum quoted from an address 
by Tony Blair to the European Union in 2005:  
The issue is not between a “free market” Europe and a social Europe, between 
those who want to retreat to a common market and those who believe in 
Europe as a political project.   
 
Here we can see Blair advocating an understanding of the “issue” which will move 
beyond the petty squabbles between those holding incompatible views on the 
European Union. Significantly, Blair’s account of his own position was evasive (cf. 
Bull, 2008). At no stage did he explicitly state what the “issue” actually was.  
 A related technique that politicians commonly use in formal public addresses is 
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to present adversarial politics, itself, as their own personal anti-logos. In the US, this 
kind of rhetorical strategy may be given a particular inflection when it is used in 
conjunction with an appeal to what Beasley (2001) termed the “shared beliefs 
hypothesis”, according to which American national identity is essentially grounded in 
an adherence to a shared set of political principles.  As an example, we may consider 
Barak Obama’s famous (Yes We Can) speech presented after his success in the 
Democratic presidential primary in South Carolina in 2008.  
We're up against decades of bitter partisanship that cause politicians to 
demonize their opponents instead of coming together to make college 
affordable or energy cleaner. It's the kind of partisanship where you're not 
even allowed to say that a Republican had an idea, even if it's one you never 
agreed with. 
 […] 
So understand this, South Carolina. The choice in this election is not between 
regions or religions or genders. It's not about rich vs. poor, young vs. old. And 
it is not about black vs. white. This election is about the past vs. the future. It's 
about whether we settle for the same divisions and distractions and drama that 
passes for politics today or whether we reach for a politics of common sense 
and innovation, a politics of shared sacrifice and shared prosperity. 
 
Once again, we can see the use of the polemical not, this time applied to a gamut of 
forms of “divisive” identity politics and “bitter” partisan political positions. By 
opposing opposition, and demonizing demonization, Obama presented himself and his 
policies as opposing nobody. 
 
4.2 Explicit Appeals to Common Ingroup Membership. 
 When faced with the need to appeal to mixed or multiple audiences, political 
communicators often attempt to regroup a composite audience into a single rhetorical 
entity (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968). We have already seen how self-
categorization theorists have drawn attention to the ways in which grass roots political 
activists attempt to mobilise support by formulating common category memberships. 
Extending this to the sphere of formal political action, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) 
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argued that political leaders act rhetorically as entrepreneurs of identity. According to 
this perspective, effective political leadership requires, (1) Regrouping diverse 
communities into a single overarching identity category; (2) Framing the (aspiring) 
leader’s own political project as the instantiation of the norms and values of that 
identity category, and (3) The (aspiring) leader’s self presentation as a prototypical 
ingroup member.  
 Reicher and Hopkins (2001) illustrated this process in a programme of research 
conducted in Scotland, in which they showed how electoral candidates attempted to 
maximize their appeal by framing both themselves and their audience in national 
terms. However, each candidate defined this superordinate national identity in such a 
way as to present their own party’s political programme as expressing the qualities 
and values that they attributed to the Scottish people in general. Members of the left-
wing Labour Party characterized Scots as inherently egalitarian, welfarist and 
opposed to privilege. In contrast, Conservative Party candidates characterized Scots as 
hard working and entrepreneurial.  In all cases, the candidates presented themselves as 
prototypical members of the national community, not simply endorsing but also 
instantiating the virtues ascribed to their imagined community of representation. 
As we noted earlier, rhetorical strategies are often polyvalent. A clear example 
of the ways in which the act of appealing explicitly to a common rhetorical ingroup 
may also entail framing a political issue in a particular way and establishing the 
legitimacy of a particular course of action (cf. Finlayson, 2006) is provided in 
Tileagă’s (2008) analysis of the former president Ion Iliescu’s addresses in the 
Romanian Parliament during official commemorations of the Romanian revolution of 
1989. These official commemorations took place in the context of a series of on-going 
political controversies, including competing accounts of over the “events” of the 
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revolution (the thousands of innocent deaths), and debates concerning Iliescu’s own 
role in the overthrow of Ceaușescu and his own sudden rise to power. In addition, 
commentators were questioning the absence of specific policies designed to confront 
the legacy of the communist past, for example, the failure to establish laws limiting 
the political influence of former members of the Communist Party or collaborators of 
the secret services).   
Tileagă noted how, against this background, Iliescu used the occasions of the 
official commemorations to establish a particular identity in relation to the Romanian 
people, which also served to promote his own preferred version of the revolution. In 
the opening section of his speeches, Iliescu used both formal forms of address 
(“Ladies and gentlemen senators and deputies”, “Distinguished members of the 
legislative bodies”) and informal forms of address (“Dear friends from the days and 
nights of the December revolution”, “Dear revolutionary friends”). The formal forms 
of address indexed Iliescu’s institutional identity and representative capacity. Through 
the informal forms of address, Iliescu positioned himself within the imagined 
community of “revolutionaries” (a post-1989 descriptor conferred to anyone who was 
seen as having actively taken part in the Revolution). In so doing, Iliescu presented 
himself as the possessor of first-hand, insider, knowledge of the Revolutionary events. 
This identity claim thus established Iliescu’s category entitlement to pass judgement 
on the events in question, which he used to warrant his preferred version of the events 
as “pure” revolution, and in so doing countered alternative versions of the Romanian 
revolution as a coup d’etat involving the Securitate (the secret police), or a foreign 
plot to force Ceausescu from office. 
 
4.3 Constructing Aspirational Identities. 
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 It is not always possible or expedient for a communicator to address a 
composite audience as a single group. One alternative involves a strategy that Frank 
(2010) termed constitutive futurity. This refers to a form of representation in which 
the object of political address (e.g. the “nation”) is projected into an undetermined 
future. In this way, a speaker is not confined to constructing a common rhetorical 
ingroup located in the narrative here-and-now, but can speak to, and on behalf of, “a 
people that is not…yet” (p. 182).  
Rogers (2012) suggested that the use of aspirational (rather than descriptive) 
appeals to common identity may have particular purchase when a speaker is acting as 
advocate for a group which is currently positioned outside, or on the margins of, a 
particular political community, as exemplified in Martin Luther King’s (1963), I Had 
a Dream speech. Rogers focused in particular on the strategies that W.E.B. Du Bois11 
employed in his polemical essays, The Souls of Black Folk (1903), noting Du Bois’s 
training in classic rhetoric at Harvard (Rampersad, 1976). Rogers argued that that Du 
Bois was faced with a specific rhetorical problem when addressing white audiences 
summed up by the question, “How will you move the people so that they will embrace 
an expanded view of themselves?” (p. 194). He suggested that Du Bois managed this 
by constructing an ingroup that shared a common political horizon rather than a 
common identity in the historical present (cf. Dunmire, 2005).  
Du Bois started out by extorting his (white) readership to sensitivity 
concerning the experiential aspects of social and political exclusion. Having 
established the audience’s normative commitment to his rhetorical project through 
appeals to empathy, Du Bois went on to evoke in the reader a sense of shame for 
complicity in the suffering of black folks (“Let the ears of a guilty people tingle with 
truth”). Throughout, Du Bois adopted a complex authorial footing which invoked a 
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distinction between (white) readers, the author and black folk, but at the same time 
presented them all as participating in a common ideological project “in the arrival of a 
truth hitherto unavailable” (p. 196). This shared horizon involved for the white 
audiences the prospect a new, extended sense of selfhood based on a sense of 
common emotional dispositions12.  
 
4.4 Implicit Displays of Rhetorical Alignment. 
Although studies of the micro-features of political rhetoric often focus on the 
ways in which political communicators overtly proclaim their membership of a 
particular category, researchers have also drawn attention to the ways in which social 
identities may be flagged implicitly, though dress, body posture, style of speech and 
use of pronouns.  The political alignments that people project through nonverbal 
media of communication do not always square with the ways in which they describe 
themselves. Condor and Abell (1996) consequently argued for the need to distinguish 
between explicit identity avowals (verbal acts of self-description) and implicit identity 
displays (the public performance of an identity).  
An interesting example of the use of clothing to implicitly display multiple 
political allegiances is provided by Ahmed’s (1997) analysis of Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah, the Great Leader of Pakistan (see also Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 171).  
Ahmed described how Jinnah (a liberal, Anglicised individual who did not speak 
Urdu) used clothing to signal his identification with Muslims throughout the Indian 
subcontinent by adopting the coat (sherwani) worn in Aligarh, the cap (karakuli) 
worn by Muslims in North India, and the trousers (shalwar) worn in the areas that 
were to become West Pakistan. 
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Perhaps the most obvious way in which a speaker may implicitly display 
alignment with others is through the use of first person plural pro-terms: “we”, “us” or 
the possessive “our”. Moss (1985 p.86) suggested that the repeated use of “we” in 
political rhetoric serves to coalesce speaker and audience “so that the immediate 
impression is one of unity and common purpose”. In addition, we may note that a 
particular advantage of pronouns lies in their capacity to signal a supposed unity and 
common purpose implicitly.  
Some research has mapped the ways in which historical transformations in 
political alignment have been signalled through a communicator’s use of the first 
person plural. For example, Ventsel (2007) analysed speeches made by the new 
political elite after the Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1940. He noted that 
immediately after the occupation “we” was used simply to refer to the local 
communists who had carried out the coup, but it soon came to be used in a more 
inclusive sense, to construct a unified subject including both communist leaders and 
the people. However, within a year, a new addressee-exclusive “we” emerged, one 
that indexed the new leaders’ alignment with The Party as opposed to The People.  
Other research has compared the ways in which different politicians use 
personal pronouns to implicitly align themselves with particular groups. For example, 
Proctor and Su (2011) analysed the ways in which the various candidates used 
pronouns in interviews and debates in the run up to the 2008 US presidential election. 
They noted that, in interview settings, Sarah Palin generally used “we” and “our” to 
signal solidarity with Americans and Alaskans, but rarely to signal solidarity with her 
running partner, presidential candidate John McCain. In contrast, Hillary Clinton 
generally used “we” to identify with the US government and the Democrats, but more 
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rarely to indicate national identification. Barak Obama was most likely to use the first 
person plural to refer to his campaign crew and to Americans.  
 
4.5 Who are “We”? Flexibility and Vagueness in the use of First Person Pronouns 
Although there are some circumstances in which it may be expedient for a 
speaker to index their alignment with a particular section of their audience, as we 
have already noted, politicians are often concerned to maintain alignment with diverse 
groups. Some analyses of political rhetoric have emphasised how communicators 
adopt a segmental technique, addressing different sections of their composite 
audience sequentially. In this context, first person plural pronouns may represent a 
useful resource in so far as the use of “we” and “us” can enable a speaker to align him 
or her self sequentially with different (possibly conflicting) sub groups without 
obviously appearing to shift narrative footing. For example, Wilson (1990) and 
Maitland and Wilson (1987) analysed speeches presented by Margaret Thatcher while 
she was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Within the same speech, and even 
within the same sentence, she could use “we” to align herself with the Conservative 
party, the Government, the British citizenry, or all right-thinking people.  
Myers (1999) observed that one problem with the segmental technique is that 
it does not enable a speaker to ingratiate themselves “simultaneously to the diverse 
components of a composite audience” (p. 56). Studies of political rhetoric have noted 
how communicators often employ strategic ambiguity, formulating arguments in a 
manner that is sufficiently vague as to admit a variety of possible interpretations. 
Vague formulations can serve a dual rhetorical function for a political communicator. 
First, they may be acceptable to (or at least difficult to challenge by) various sections 
of a heterogeneous audience. Second, whilst appearing decisive, they do not in fact 
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commit the speaker to any particular course of action, therefore allowing for future 
flexibility in political rhetoric and policy decisions whilst maintaining an apparent 
stance of ideological commitment and consistency of purpose. Fortunately for 
political communicators, the precise referent of first person plural pronouns can be so 
vague as to elude even professional linguists (Borthen, 2010).  
Duncan (2011) reported a particular variety of strategic ambiguity that he 
termed polemical ambiguity. This involves a speaker using strong dualistic 
formulations, but expressing these through forms of wording which are so vague that 
the precise nature of the argument is unclear to potential allies in the audience, while 
potentially alienated groups perceive a clear message with which they can identify. As 
an example, Duncan took the case of President George W. Bush's speech to a joint 
session of the US Congress on 20 September 2001, in which he was addressing the 
composite audience of the members of the United States Congress, and also the 
universal audiences of the American people, and by implication, “the leadership and 
citizenry of all other nations in the world, as well as terrorist groups…[in short] the 
entire planet” (p. 457). Duncan noted Bush’s heavy use of “globe-sweeping 
antithes[es]” (p. 458): right vs. wrong, good vs. evil, us vs. them (see also, Coe et al., 
2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004). This polemical style was, Duncan observed, 
accompanied by the consistent use of vague and ambiguous referents, as illustrated by 
the text’s well-known climax:  
And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation 
in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with 
the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. 
 
The meaning of phrases such as “aid or safe haven to terrorism,” or “harbor or 
support terrorism” is unclear, and Bush’s argument would be hard to refute on either 
epistemological or moral grounds. Of particular relevance to our current concerns is 
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the ambiguity of Bush’s use of pronouns: we, us, and you.  In all cases, these 
pronouns clearly do not include “the terrorists” (whoever they may be). However, in 
context, you could refer to “any nation, nations, or peoples, whether currently an ally, 
enemy, or neutral” (Duncan, 2011, p. 458). We and us could mean “the United States, 
all Americans, Republicans, supporters of the Bush administration, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) members, the Western world, peace-loving peoples, or 
just the winners” (p. 458). 
 
4.6 Using Pronouns to Display Complex Political Allegiances  
In English, as in many other European languages, the first person plural can be 
used in an inclusive or an exclusive sense. Terms such as “we” and “us” can, on 
occasions, exclude either the speaker or the audience. For example, a speaker-
exclusive “we” (De Cock, 2011) can be used to signal allegiance rather than literal 
identification, as exemplified by Churchill’s famous speech, made after the 
evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940: ‘‘We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the 
landing grounds’’. As Wilson, (1990) observed, Churchill was not suggesting that he 
personally would be participating in the armed combat.  The speaker-exclusive “we” 
may also be used to display goodwill towards, or shared common ground in relation 
to, those very communities of opinion with whom a speaker is currently disagreeing. 
The following example has been taken from W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1928 speech, The 
Negro Citizen13 
So, too, in the matter of housing, recreation and crime we seem here to assume 
that a knowledge of the facts of discrimination and of the needs of the colored 
public are sufficient, with faith, hope and charity, to bring ultimate 
betterment... 
 
 39 
Du Bois was arguing that mere knowledge of the disadvantages faced by African 
Americans would not be sufficient to ensure progressive social change. Consequently, 
he was not using we to signal his acceptance of a common point of view. Rather, his 
use of we in this context is indexing his empathy with, and goodwill towards, the 
audience.  
In other situations, a political commentator may include themselves in the 
pronoun “we” but exclude their audience. The use of an addressee-exclusive “we” is 
perhaps most obvious in cases where a politician uses first person plural pronouns to 
refer specifically to their political party or to the government. The following example 
was taken from a speech by Vernon Coaker MP, delivered to the Centenary 
Conference of the Irish Labour Party in 201214: 
We in the Labour Party will speak up for the peace and progress – as the party 
who in government helped with others to bring about the Good Friday 
Agreement and all that flowed from it – and we will stand up for fairness in 
tough times. 
 
Even in cases such as this, the precise referent of the pronoun may remain 
underdetermined. Mr Coaker, a member of the British Labour Party, regularly slipped 
between using “we in the Labour Party” as (nationally) audience-exclusive and as 
(politically) audience-inclusive15.  
Addressee-exclusive we’s can also be used to soften disagreement. Fløttum 
(2010) quoted the following extract from a from an address made by Tony Blair to the 
European parliament in 2005: 
We talk of crisis. Let us first talk of achievement. 
Blair was presenting the discourse of “crisis” as his anti logos. Consequently, in this 
utterance, we actually means “they” or “you”, and us means “me”. One might 
reasonably suppose that Blair’s objective in referring to his political adversaries as 
“we” was to display a general sense of empathy and goodwill. However, we cannot 
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tell whether audiences did, in fact, interpret his words in this way. Depending on 
context, speaker-exclusive “we's” can be interpreted as markers of empathy, or as 
coercive or condescending. 
The referents of first person plural pronouns are not confined to the narrative 
present.  As a consequence, a communicator can use terms such as “we” or “our” to 
display consubstantiality with historically expanded social categories, and to construct 
aspirational ingroups (Condor, 2006). This is illustrated in the following extract from 
a speech presented by George W. Bush to the Pentagon in 2003: 
We cannot know the duration of this war, yet we know its outcome: We will 
prevail…the Iraqi people will be free, and our world will be more secure and 
peaceful. 
 
Bush’s first two uses of we are within present-tense clauses, and conjure up the image 
of shared experience between people existing in the narrative here-and-now. 
However, his third and fourth use of the first person plural (we will…, our world 
will…), projects his rhetorical ingroup into an indeterminate future, possibly beyond 
the life-times of the people included in his first two synchronic we's.  
 
4.7 Using First Person Plural Pronouns to Convey Ideological Messages 
We have already noted how a speaker may use explicit identity appeals not 
simply as a generic means by which to enlist an audience, but also to establish their 
commitment to a particular ideological project. When speakers enlist audiences using 
first person plural pronouns, ideological messages may be imported into their 
arguments more subtly.   
Linguists have noted how the referent of first person plural pronouns may 
“wander” (Petersoo, 2007) within speeches or texts and even within single sentences 
or phrases. The slippery nature of terms such as “we” and “us” means that they can be 
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used to link a potentially contentious political concept to a relatively benign one. For 
example, in political discourse, authors may start out by using “we” as a reference to 
themselves and their immediate audience, but then slip to using “we” to refer to the 
government, and to using “our” to refer to the economy or the armed services (e.g. 
“the strength of our economy”). In this way, a speaker may subtly elide the interests 
of the audience with those and with the government, the military, or corporate 
business (Fairclough, 2000).  
This capacity for construct elision through referent slippage takes its most 
extreme form in what Billig (1995) termed the syntax of hegemony, in which the 
vagueness of first person plural pronouns establishes a functional equivalence 
between a particular group and universal humanity. As Billig (1995, p.90) observed, 
by mobilising a nonspecific “we”, political orators can present the interests of their 
party, government, nation as coinciding with those of the entire world, “so long as 
‘we’ do not specify what ‘we’ mean by ‘we’, but instead allow the first person plural 
to suggest a harmony of interests and identities”.  
This kind of rhetorical formulation has been most extensively studied in New 
World Order rhetoric on “the war on terror” (e.g. Coe et al., 2004; Leudar, Marsland 
& Nekvapil, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004). As we saw from the quotation from George 
W. Bush’s 2001 speech cited above, in US foreign policy statements, “we” can both 
be used to signify the United States and also to refer to a US-led, system of collective 
security. An example of the use of the syntax of hegemony can be seen in the 
quotation from George W. Bush’s 2003 speech cited on page xxx, above: 
We cannot know the duration of this war, yet we know its outcome: We will 
prevail…the Iraqi people will be free, and our world will be more secure and 
peaceful. 
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From the context, “we” could refer equally to the US or to the coalition. However, 
“our world” could be interpreted as a universal referent, suggesting that the US 
national or international military alliance is defending universal interests and 
universal values of freedom, security and peace.  
As we noted earlier, the allegiances that a communicator displays through the 
use of pronouns need not always square with the identities to which they explicitly lay 
claim. Condor (2006) coined the term forked tongue strategy to refer to a situation in 
which a speaker explicitly claims one identity and ideological commitment in 
principle, whilst displaying a different set of allegiances and ideological commitments 
through deictic reference. As an example, let us consider the following stretch of talk 
taken from the opening statement by the Chair of a meeting of the Scottish National 
Party, reported in Reicher and Hopkins, (2001, p. 165).  
Fellow Scots! It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all here tonight. And 
when I say “fellow Scots” I include all those categories excluded by Nicholas 
Fairbairn. And I also include all our English friends who live among us, and who 
have chosen to throw in their lot with us, more than a few. 
  
Reicher and Hopkins’s original analysis focused on the explicit message 
conveyed in this stretch of talk. They noted how the speaker was invoking an 
inclusive ingroup, thus potentially maximizing his potential constituency of 
representation. In his metadiscursive move (“And when I say ‘fellow Scots’”), the 
speaker argued that this category construction reflects his Party’s ideological 
commitment to a civic understanding of Scottish identity, one which was not 
shared by the Conservative Party (whose more exclusive definition of the category 
of Scots had been exemplified in a speech made four days earlier by the MP 
Nicholas Fairbairn). For present purposes, however, the significant aspect of this 
stretch of talk lies in the way in which, in the very course of proclaiming his 
inclusive understanding of Scottish identity, the speaker uses pronouns to 
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implicitly exclude people born in England (“our English friends”) from the 
Scottish national “us”.  
 
5.0 Concluding Remarks 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 The study of rhetoric is necessarily a reflexive enterprise. Anyone who writes 
on the subject of rhetoric is also using rhetoric. Throughout this chapter, we have 
noted some of the difficulties involved in summarizing the topic of political rhetoric 
for a mixed and multiple audience of political psychologists. In the first place, it is not 
easy to place the subject into a tidy academic pigeonhole. Work on political rhetoric is 
not the province of any particular discipline, and there is no single, essential, feature 
which can be used to distinguish theory and research on political rhetoric from work 
on political argument, debate, communication or discourse. In part, our aim in this 
chapter has been to provide a coherent overview of theoretical and empirical work 
that was originally conceived and written within a variety of academic traditions. 
Any discussion of rhetoric in general, and political rhetoric in particular, 
cannot easily be delimited historically. In this chapter we have emphasized recently 
published work in order to update the information conveyed in the previous edition of 
the Handbook. However, because contemporary scholars continue to use classical 
terminology and to draw upon the writings of Aristotle, Plato and Cicero, we cannot 
simply confine past writing on rhetoric to academic history. More generally, it is 
difficult for an author to structure an overview of work on political rhetoric in the 
standard narrative form conventionally used for reviewing a body of psychological 
research. Many contemporary authors would resist the idea that their work is 
“progressing” rhetorical scholarship beyond the classical tradition. Moreover, much 
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of the recent work on political rhetoric tends to take the form of individual piecemeal 
studies, rather than systematic, incremental, research programmes.  
 On the one hand, the disconnected character of much current research on 
political rhetoric might reasonably be regarded as a problem. Certainly, the lack of 
cross-referencing between articles on similar issues (especially common when this 
work has been conducted by academics with different disciplinary affiliations) is 
regrettable, not least because individual authors often coin neologisms, leading to a 
confusing diversity of terminology to refer to what are, essentially, similar 
considerations. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that many of the 
apparent problems which confront anyone attempting to review work on political 
rhetoric are also reflections of the very nature of the subject matter. Rhetoric is 
essentially and inevitably complex, reflexive, argumentative, fluid and contextual. 
Consequently, political psychologists who have been trained in the technê of 
operationalization and experimental control may find the study of rhetoric something 
of an intellectual culture shock.  
In the worlds of political rhetoric, constructs cannot be marshalled into 
dependent, independent, moderating and mediating variables. Analyses of specific 
examples of political rhetoric do not treat context as a pre-designated setting in which, 
or towards which, individuals respond. Rather, the “rhetorical situation” is itself 
understood to be constituted through the process of argument. Analysis of the fine 
detail of political rhetoric reveals social categories and stereotypes to be the objects of 
continual contestation, and draws our attention to the ways in which political actors 
may attend to multiple facets of their identity simultaneously.  
Consideration of the ways in which people structure and respond to political 
arguments shows that their actions are not solely determined by particular norms 
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rendered salient by a specific social context, nor are they motivated simply by a need 
to reduce subjective uncertainty. On the contrary, political communications are 
typically formulated with a view to dilemmatic epistemological and moral concerns, 
and to competing prescriptive norms for action. Kane and Patapan (2010) described 
political rhetoric as the “artless art”, in recognition of the fact that political leaders 
need to use rhetoric without appearing to do so.  Effective political communicators 
also need to deal with a range of additional competing demands, such as 
demonstrating consistency in defence of a particular ideological project whilst 
avoiding charges of partiality; or mobilizing identity categories whilst at the same 
time maintaining the appearance of rational disinterest (Potter & Edwards, 1990).  
Billig (1987/1996) borrowed the sixteenth century rhetorician Ralph Lever’s 
term “witcraft” to describe the skilful and creative ways in which professional 
politicians and ordinary social actors formulate arguments in the context of debate. By 
paying attention to the fine details of political argumentation we can appreciate how 
speakers can mobilise similar considerations to support quite different rhetorical ends, 
and how the same rhetorical project may be supported by an infinite number of 
possible lines of argument. In short, political communicators use language and other 
symbolic resources flexibly, creatively and ironically to construct new patterns of 
argument, and to undermine the newly constructed claims of their opponents. 
Consequently, any quest for general laws, which neatly map particular rhetorical 
forms onto specific functions, will necessarily be doomed to failure.  
For researchers accustomed to parsing human behaviour into factors and 
levels, into stable entities or quantifiable dimensions, the study of political rhetoric 
confronts us with the apparent chaos of an underdetermined and monstrous realm 
where utterances are polyvalent, actions evasive, values dilemmatic, and where 
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factual assertions and appeals to consensual common sense may be successful in so 
far as they are, in practice, radically ambiguous. For the scholar of rhetoric, on the 
other hand, these complexities are regarded as evidence of witcraft, of the 
inventiveness, playfulness, and deadly seriousness, of human social and political life.  
 
.  
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NOTES 
                                                
1 Contemporary commentators often suggest that rhetorical scholarship may itself promote a 
democratic message in so far as it holds out the “promise of reason” against the “brute force” 
of violence, or authoritarian coercion (Gage, 2011). Theorists who adopt a rhetorical 
perspective often challenge deficit models of mass publics (Troup, 2009) in so far as they 
recognize, and celebrate, ordinary citizens’ capacity to engage in open-ended reasoning and 
rational debate about public affairs. 
 
2 Garver (2009) has questioned whether actual instances of rhetorical argument easily fit into 
this classificatory scheme.  
 
3 Notwithstanding an in-principle recognition of the importance of the visual aspects of 
political rhetoric, most empirical research continues to focus on the spoken and written word, 
seldom even considering the ways in which information and evaluation may be conveyed 
through intonation, facial expressions or hand movements (cf. Mendoza-Denton & Jannedy, 
2011; Streeck, 2008). 
 
4 Political “representation” may itself be understood in various ways (Pitkin, 1967; Saward, 
2010). In democratic regimes, an elected representative may be positioned as a delegate, 
acting as spokesperson for their constituents or as a trustee, charged with using their expert 
skills to serve the best interests of those they represent, even if their arguments do not 
necessarily reflect the immediate will of the people themselves. Spokespeople for 
nongovernmental organizations may claim to represent the interests of a particular 
constituency without the members ever being consulted. Finally, an individual or group can 
adopt the stance of defending the interests or rights of animals or “the planet”, a practice that 
might be understood as a form of stewardship.     
 
5 This inclusive notion of rhetoric is not universally accepted. For example, Bitzer (1968) 
restricted his construct of the rhetorical situation to settings in there is an exigency that is 
capable of being modified though discourse, and where there is an audience who is potentially 
capable of being influenced by the discourse and acting as mediators of change.  
 
6 Billig (1996; Shotter & Billig, 1998) noted parallels between rhetorical psychology and 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) understanding of language as the vehicle of thought (remark 329), and 
Bakhtin’s (1981) perspective on thought as inner speech. 
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7 For a similar perspective on attitudes as evaluative discourse, see Potter (1998). 
 
8 In this respect, rhetorical psychology focuses on what social psychologists have traditionally 
termed verbal or public (as opposed to private and implicit) attitudes. 
 
9 At the time that Billig was developing rhetorical psychology, social psychologists typically 
endorsed what subsequent commentators called a file draw model of attitudes, according to 
which individuals hold opinions on all manner of issues and which they simply retrieve from 
memory for the purposes of responding to survey questions. More recent perspectives on 
attitudes as online constructions (e.g. Schwarz, 2007) differ from Billig’s approach in so far 
as they regard attitudes primarily as mental phenomena, but share his concern for the ways in 
which attitude statements are formulated in local interaction. 
 
10 Although Finlayson distinguished RPA from linguistic and Critical Discourse Analytic 
approaches, in practice his account of the ways in which RPA might inform empirical 
research has much in common with these perspectives. In addition, Finlayson’s focus on the 
use of rhetoric in political decision-making has clear parallels with Fairclough and 
Fairclough’s (e.g. 2012) critical discourse analytic approach to practical reasoning. 
 
12 This observation has parallels with recent social psychological work that has considered the 
role of intergroup emotions such as empathy (Dovidio, Johnson, Gaertner et al., 2010) shame 
and guilt (Lickel, Steele & Schmader, 2011) in promoting support for minorities on the part of 
majorities.  
 
13 National Interracial Conference December 1928 Washington D.C. 
 
14 17 April 2012 Speech reported on 
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/feature_story.asp?id=19629  
 
15 In addition, when a politician uses a political-party or government “we”, it is not always 
clear whether the speaker is necessarily signalling his or her own personal commitment to the 
content of a message. Bull and Fetzer (Bull & Fetzer 2006; Fetzer & Bull, 2008) have noted 
how politicians may on occasions use a collective (normally Party) “we” to avoid being held 
personally accountable for a potentially contentious view or course of action.  
 
